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Trends in doctor-manager relationships
Huw T O Davies, Stephen Harrison
Doctors are discontented, and one reason is their dissatisfaction with their relationship with
managers. This article explores how management structures have changed over the past few decades
and explains how a better understanding of the dynamics behind healthcare delivery might help to
ease the tensions between doctors and their managers
Doctors are increasingly unhappy in a changing
world.1 Although the reasons for this are broad and far
reaching,2 some of this discontent results from the
doctor-management interface.3 The rejection of the
new NHS consultant contract in England and Wales
seemed to crystallise this discontent, hinging as it did
on issues of professional autonomy and a lack of trust.4
But such a crisis should not be seen in isolation.We can
better understand the current predicament by, firstly,
reviewing the history of the doctor-manager relation-
ship in the United Kingdom over recent decades, and
in particular seeing this relationship as shaped by the
changing structural arrangements from within which
health care is delivered. Secondly, such changes are in
turn part of an international phenomenon, related in
particular to perceived crises of healthcare funding
and consequent attempts to improve efficiency.
This overview aims to summarise each of these ele-
ments. We draw on a recent review of international
developments,5 pre-existing reviews charting changes
in the doctor-manager relationship in the NHS 6–8, and
a range of more recent empirical studies.9–14
Management and structural change in
the NHS
For a quarter of a century after the foundation of the
NHS, its main structures stayed largely intact.After 1974,
however, reforms occurred increasingly often, culminat-
ing in almost perpetual upheaval in the past five years.
Three key reorganisations were the introduction of gen-
eral management in 1984, the opening up from 1991 of
an internal market, and the repeated rounds of
performance and accountability initiatives after the elec-
tion of a “new Labour” government in 1997. The
shifting patterns of doctor-manager relationships over
these periods can then be examined in terms of two key
issues—how the relative influence of doctors and
managers has changed and what were and are the main
determinants and focuses of managerial agendas.
Relative influence of doctors and managers
From the early days of the NHS, doctors rather than
managers (then, tellingly, officially called administrators)
had dominant and pervasive influence. The shape and
distribution of services arose from an accumulation of
individual clinical decisions, with managers supporting
and administering these arrangements rather than seek-
ing to challenge them.15 The introduction of general
management in 1984 provided a focus for financial
administration but left patterns of clinical care—and
hence influence from doctors—largely untouched.6
However, the development of the internal market in the
early 1990s, the subsequent increasingly strident set of
demands about service delivery and accountability, and
most recently the introduction of clinical governance
have all enabled managers to drive through substantial
restructuring of clinical services, sometimes in the face
of outright physician dissent.16
Throughout this period there weremany attempts to
involve doctors more fully in management activities,9
including the statutory role of the medical director and
the development of clinical directorates. Such participa-
tion by doctors in management has not been easily
accomplished, with medical directors experiencing con-
siderable workload challenges and stress17 and clinical
directors displaying high levels of disenchantment.11
Thus, despite this rebalancing of power between doctors
Summary points
One reason for the high level of doctors’
discontent lies in the doctor-manager relationship
Such discontent reflects international trends that
have led to diminished autonomy and a reduced
dominance of doctors in health care
In recent years the “scientific-bureaucratic” model
of healthcare delivery has risen to prominence
This model emphasises external robust evidence
over personal professional expertise, with
patterns of care driven more by managerial
processes than through professional motivation
Understanding these dynamics may enable a
rethinking of the psychological contract between
doctors and the organisations in which they
provide services
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and managers, a sense often remains among both
groups that the important power lies elsewhere, so that
a degree of disempowerment is frequently felt on
both sides.
Determinants and focus of managerial agendas
Administrators in the 1970s and early ’80s tended to be
reactive to emergent problems rather than proactive in
developing corporate objectives. The key clients in terms
of determiningmanagerial activity were senior clinicians
rather than service users.18 At the same time, political
control was relatively loose, although this tightened in
the 1980s as general management provided a focal
point for political leverage. The emergence of (even
relatively attenuated) competitive forces in the 1990s
drove managers to be more proactive in developing
strategic objectives and plans to meet these. 19 Thus
managers increasingly had a corporate outlook, seeking
to maintain and develop their own institutions’ facilities.
As the market was replaced by supposedly more
cooperative forms of working—supplemented by central
diktat, the national performance framework, star ratings,
and a plethora of regulatory and inspection mecha-
nisms—the focus of senior management changed such
that they are now seen more as agents of government
than as facilitators of professionally driven agendas.
Although these changes are hugely important, they
should be seen as gradual shifts and accumulations
over time rather than as stark discontinuities resulting
from specific policy initiatives. Furthermore, although
doctors resisted (sometimes vociferously) many of the
underlying changes, they quickly assimilated the
changes and their corollaries12 and seemed to have
little desire to revert to prior arrangements.8 In this
there may well be substantial age related effects—for
example, junior doctors are keen to be more involved
in management roles.20 Specialties may also differ, with
some—such as radiology, pathology, and psychiatry—
being more sympathetic to a managerial culture.13 The
changes, however, have not been without consequence
for professional practice.
International trends
Trends in developed, liberal democracies may be
summarised in the following broad terms, though this
conceals some important differences of detail.5 Firstly,
there has been an increasing “systematisation” of
medical knowledge. This has occurred partly through
methods that allow the measurement of medical work
for managerial purposes—for example, case-mix
measures such as diagnosis related groups and similar.
Such measures have been used in many countries,
including the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands, as a possible
basis for prospective remuneration for healthcare
institutions. Systematisation of medical knowledge has
also occurred worldwide through strategies that
determine how doctors should deliver care, both at the
level of the individual patient encounter (for example,
clinical protocols and guidelines) and in terms of the
processing of patients through the system (for example,
prescribed “patient pathways”).
Secondly, increasing attention has been paid to the
financial and other incentives offered to doctors.
Incentives may be aimed directly at individual
doctors—such as capitation payments, caps on fee-for-
service income, and target payments for screening set
proportions of a population. Incentives may also be
aimed indirectly—related to workload for the hospitals
and clinics in which doctors are increasingly located.
Incentivising organisations in this way increases the
need for medical work to be managed. Most countries
are now paying greater attention to the incentives con-
text for medical work, particularly through the
arrangements of managed care.21
Thirdly, state regulation of medicine as a profession
has been modified and supplemented in various ways.
Some such modifications aim to reduce the supply of
doctors—as in Germany, France, and Italy—whereas
other reforms aim to reduce the medical near-
monopoly of the institutions of state registration, as in
the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Spain. Much regula-
tory activity is aimed more directly at modifying clinical
practice22 and includes the creation of new inspectorates,
the introduction of compulsory clinical audit, publi-
cation of league tables of hospital and clinic perform-
ance indicators, and tightened gate keeping arrange-
ments between primary and secondary care or between
ambulatory and hospital care. A wide range of countries
have adopted such approaches, including the United
Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and Belgium.
An overriding theme of the diverse changes over 30
years has been a substantial erosion of the professional
medical dominance and autonomy.7 Although different
aspects of medical autonomy at the micro level can be
identified (box), all of these have to some extent been
undermined, constrained, or curtailed as a consequence
of the trends outlined above.
Aspects of clinical autonomy7
Control over diagnosis and treatment—Decisions about which tests and
examinations are appropriate; the drugs and procedures to be used; who to
refer and where; and the nature of follow up care
Control over evaluations of care—Judgments about the appropriateness of
either the care of individual patients or the overall patterns of care provided
Control over nature and volume of medical tasks—The extent to which doctors
are left to determine their own priorities, workloads, and supporting
activities, including the location and timing of these activities
Contractual independence—The extent to which doctors have unilateral rights
to engage in extracurricular activities such as teaching, research, royal
college or BMA business, commercial consultancy, or private practice
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Changing modes of medical practice
Medical practice can be characterised according to two
different dimensions.23 Firstly, we can consider the extent
to which valid knowledge is seen as tacit rather than
explicit, derived from personal experience rather than
systematic study. Secondly, we can identify whether the
key drivers for implementation of that knowledge are
individual and internal rather than external and
collective. Combining these two dimensions gives rise to
four models of medical practice—the reflective practice
model, the professional consensus model, the critical
appraisal model, and the scientific-bureaucratic model
(figure). Although the descriptions of each represent
“idealised types,” all of these are present in medical care
to some extent, and the balance between them has
changed substantially over time.
The reflective practice model represents a tra-
ditional view of medical care. Doctors provide care to
patients on an individualised basis, adapting their
practice in the light of ongoing experience and success.
They work largely independently of organising
structures and are less concerned with external
formalised bodies of knowledge than with their own
expanding clinical understanding and tacit knowledge.
The professional consensus model also emphasises
accumulated clinical wisdom but consolidates this in
the form of explicit guidance condensed from expert
panels. Institutional arrangements may then be used to
try to encourage a greater degree of compliance with
these expert perceptions of “best practice.”
The critical appraisal model tackles some of the
deficiencies of a knowledge base that is overly reliant
on personal experience or expert view. Here, the
emphasis is on externally generated, methodologically
sound evidence, such as that derived from various
clinical epidemiological studies. However, the imple-
mentation of such evidence is still left to doctors’ indi-
vidual discretion based on an integration of evidence
with individual patient characteristics and preferences.
The scientific-bureaucratic model also emphasises
robust, objective evidence but sees such evidence as
being formalised into prescriptions for practice and
models for service delivery. It brings this together with
formal, externally driven strategies for implementa-
tion, thus reducing individual discretion about practice
patterns.
Although each of these models remains in most
healthcare systems, the scientific-bureaucratic model
has risen in prominence in several countries over the
past decade.7 8 Modes of medical practice have been
changing from individualised and sometimes idiosyn-
cratic care underpinned by professional values to man-
aged corporate delivery underpinned by more explicit
bodies of knowledge. This change is the source of
many of the current conflicts between doctors and
managers.
A reliance on science applied through managerial
processes may bring benefits—increased performance,
improved efficiency, and greater uniformity. However,
such benefits may come at a cost as a rigid formality
may conflict with deeply held professional values such
as autonomy, solidarity, flexibility, and a belief in tacit
knowledge. A doctor’s focus on individual patients is
always likely to clash with the manager’s need to take a
more utilitarian view. More importantly, scientific-
bureaucratic approaches to health care may induce a
range of dysfunctions as well as being unable to cope
with the complexity and context-dependent nature of
health care.24 Such inadequacies and dysfunctions are
likely to become more obvious as greater reliance is
placed on a managerial approach.25
Conclusion
Substantial evidence now attests to the extent of
doctors’ unhappiness with the state of their relation-
ships with managers and identifies some of the under-
lying dynamics.11 Although much of this evidence
relates to the acute sector, similar tensions can be
expected in primary care as primary care trusts begin
to develop and the new general practitioner contract is
implemented. We have shown that the current
situation is both a culmination of longstanding trends
in the NHS and part of a more general international
phenomenon.
There are many reasons to tackle this discontent:
disillusionment, lack of morale, loss of trust, misalign-
ment, and miscommunication are hardly recipes for
high quality patient care. If, as the government hopes,
regulated markets and consumer choice are to be
effective forces for improved quality and performance
then this cannot happen without better alignment
between doctors and the organisations in which they
provide services.
The extent of cultural divergence between manag-
ers, doctors, and other professional groups suggests that
such a realignment will be far from easy.26 Lay managers
tend to favour a greater degree of rationalisation and
transparency in work organisation than do clinicians,10
and managers with clinical backgrounds can find it diffi-
cult to combine their two divergent professional roles.19
None the less, despite the many good reasons that doc-
tors may not wish to be involved in management, and
the considerable tensions that arise when they are,14 fur-
ther engagement is indeed needed.
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Medicine, management, and modernisation:
a “danse macabre”?
Pieter Degeling, Sharyn Maxwell, John Kennedy, Barbara Coyle
To break their destructive antagonism over issues of health service modernisation, doctors and
managers should engage more directly with nursing and allied health professionals when
responding to reform initiatives
Edwards and Marshall have recently called for
constructive dialogue to replace the mutual suspicion
between doctors and managers.1 They suggest that the
recent tensions over the negotiation of the new UK
consultant contract should be seen as part of a “deeper
problem [with] a long history.” They propose that doc-
tors’ and managers’ very different approaches to
issues such as accountability, use of guidelines, and
finance are the result of each discipline’s training,
beliefs, and experiences. Finally, they suggest that, left
unresolved, these differences have the potential to
threaten individual institutions and perhaps even the
future of the NHS.
In this article we offer a brief analysis of the wider
nature and the essential elements of the reforms being
sought by governments. We offer some cross-national
evidence to support the proposition that understand-
ing different professional cultures is crucial for under-
standing each profession’s response to the reforms.We
conclude by drawing on that evidence to offer some
ways forward.
Orientations of reform
Reforming how clinical work is organised, performed,
and monitored has been at or near the top of the
policy agenda in most industrial societies for the past
25 years. The reasons for this are:
x The growing cost of health care, leading to
questions about the resource efficiency of existing
modes of service delivery
x Doubts about the appropriateness and value of
existing patterns of clinical work organisation
Summary points
Calls to modernise health services require health
professionals to accept that all clinical decisions
have resource dimensions, recognise the need to
balance clinical autonomy with transparent
accountability, support the systemisation of
clinical work, and subscribe to the power sharing
implications of team based approaches to clinical
work
There are consistent and marked differences in
how medical, nursing, and managerial staff across
countries evaluate individual aspects of such a
reform programme
Policy authorities’ efforts to overcome resistance
to reforms by widening the scope and reach of
“top-down” performance management and
regulation are self defeating
What is required is more support for clinicians
and others (including nurse managers) to pursue
modernised clinical work practices
Re-establishing “responsible autonomy” as the
primary organising principle of clinical work will
empower health professionals to strike a balance
between the clinical and resource dimensions of
care and between clinical autonomy and
transparent accountability
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